A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The complete case

A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a complete preferential vote. Completeness means that every voter expresses a comparison (a preference or a tie) about each pair of options. The proposed method is proved to have certain desirable properties, which include: the continuity of the rates with respect to the data, a decomposition property that characterizes certain situations opposite to a tie, the Condorcet-Smith principle, and a property of clone consistency. One can view this rating method as a complement for the ranking method introduced in 1997 by Markus Schulze. It is also related to certain methods of one-dimensional scaling or cluster analysis.Comment: This is part one of a revised version of arxiv:0810.2263. Version 3 is the result of certain modifications, both in the statement of the problem and in the concluding remarks, that enhance the results of the paper; the results themselves remain unchange

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

A prudent characterization of the Ranked Pairs Rule

We show that the Ranked Pairs Rule is equivalent to selecting the maximal linear orders with respect to a DiscriMin relation, which is a natural refinement of the Min relation used to define Arrow and Raynaud's prudent orders. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the Ranked Pairs Rule by building on an earlier characterization of the prudent order ranking rule. We conclude that a monotonicity criterion is the main distinction between the two ranking rules. © 2008 Springer-Verlag.SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe